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CHRIS P. LONG
Georgetown University
This paper examines when firms pursue structural realignment through business
unit reconfiguration, specifically by recombining business units. Our results refine and
extend contingency theory and studies of organization design by drawing on theories of
decision avoidance and delay to describe environmental conditions when firms pursue or
postpone structural realignment. Our empirical analysis of 46 firms from 1978 to 1997,
operating within the U.S. medical device and pharmaceutical sectors, demonstrates that
while decision makers initiate structural recombination during periods of industry growth
(i.e., munificence), they reduce their recombination efforts during periods of industry tur-
bulence (i.e., dynamism), and managerial turbulence (i.e., growth in top management team
size). We also find evidence that firms delay realignment and bide their time for better
environmental conditions of declining turbulence and industry growth before pursuing
more structural realignment. Together, these findings suggest that decision makers often
delay initiating structural recombination until they can effectively process information and
assess how structural changes will help them realign the organization to the environment.
INTRODUCTION
This paper asks a fundamental question in organi-
zation theory—how and when do firms align their
structures with environmental changes? Contingency
theory suggests that firms, when faced with changing
external conditions, should realign to gain fitwith their
environment and better capture market opportunities
(Donaldson, 1987; Duncan, 1972; Hofer, 1975). One
mechanism by which to achieve this realignment is
to redesign the structure of the organization (Burns &
Stalker, 1961;Miller &Friesen, 1984; Thompson, 1967;
Woodward, 1965). The perspectivewedevelop in this
paper builds on the conceptualization of organization
design (i.e., and its redesign) “as something that or-
ganizations do, rather than merely as something they
have” (Orton & Weick, 1990: 218; italics added by
authors).Althoughcontingency theory’s expectations
of how to realign (e.g., through structural change) are
generally supported in the literature, our under-
standing of when firms make these decisions is less
well established. In this paper, we address this issue
by examining a series of factors that influence when
firms choose to initiate and enact structural re-
alignment decisions.Wedrawupon decision-making
and group dynamics research to inform contingency
theory about expectations relating to the speed of
decision making and consensus-building within ex-
ecutive teams.
We examine this general, theoretical question about
structural realignment by evaluating when and how
firms recombine their business units (Eisenhardt &
Brown, 1999; Karim, 2006). In developing and modi-
fying their organizations’ designs through structural
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recombination, decision makers attempt to create or
enhance value by reconfiguring their firms’ existing
resources (Karim, 2009; Karim & Kaul, 2015; Karim &
Capron, 2015). A “recombined” unit is any unit that
has experienced a change in boundaries through some
addition or deletion of activities and resources that
have been moved within the firm. We focus on struc-
tural recombination in this paper because firms rou-
tinely use this mechanism to redistribute resources
inside theorganization inorder to regaincongruenceor
alignment with changes in environmental conditions.
Unit boundaries expanding and contracting indicate
a firm’s efforts to reallocate existing resources (Karim,
2012). Thus, examining structural recombination al-
lows us to take a close look at the processes behind
organization design changes.
Because structural recombination can often rep-
resent costly and risky initiatives, it is important to
understand what factors influence decision makers
to use this mechanism to achieve realignment with
their environments (Helfat & Karim, 2014). Drawing
on existing contingency theory studies, we expect
that decision makers’ perceptions of environmental
industry growth should increase recombination
initiatives. However, whereas classic contingency
theory suggests that industry turbulence may also
trigger this realignment, we identify information
processing challenges that inhibit executives from
engaging in structural recombination during periods
of environmental industry turbulence (i.e., when
relationships between key performance antecedents
and indicators change very rapidly).
We use research from the decision-making litera-
ture (Dobrajska, Billinger, & Karim, 2015) on deci-
sion avoidance and delay to explain these dynamics
(Anderson, 2003). Specifically, we argue that be-
cause strategic decisionmakers in turbulent industry
environments are unable to collect and process the
information necessary to assess cause-and-effect
relationships, they cannot develop decision-making
strategies to effectively predict how structural changes
can positively influence firm performance. The result-
ing difficulties they experience in identifying organi-
zational forms that are appropriate for environmental
contingencies decrease their overall willingness to en-
gage in structural recombination during periods of en-
vironmental turbulence (Davis,Eisenhardt,&Bingham,
2009; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005).
Because structural realignment decisions are usu-
ally made by the top management team (TMT)
Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001; Helfat & Karim, 2014),
we also examinehow factorswithin these collectives
may foster or inhibit firms’ tendencies to recombine
business units. We specifically demonstrate how
executive turnover and increases in overall TMTsize
decrease the overall level of structural recombina-
tion that firms engage. Here, we translate research
on decision delays in groups to theorize how these two
factors limit the capacities of TMTs tobuild the levels of
consensus and commitment necessary to identify ap-
propriate organizational forms and initiate structural
recombination (Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Bavelas,
1951; Dooley, Fryxell, & Judge, 2000; Eisenhardt, 1990).
By examining the influences of both external in-
dustry (i.e., market) turbulence and internal manage-
rial (i.e.,withinTMTs) turbulenceon firms’ tendencies
to initiate structural recombination, our theory refines
arguments put forth by contingency theorists and or-
ganization design scholars about how and when firms
align their structures with their environments
(Duncan, 1972; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson,
1967). While general contingency theory suggests that
firms initiate structural realignment to adapt to envi-
ronmental changes, our research demonstrates that
firms tend to delay the initiation of structural recom-
bination until industry turbulence lessens and de-
cision makers are able to more effectively assess how
these structural changes may benefit the firm (Burns &
Stalker, 1961; Miles & Snow, 1978; Miller, 1988;
Mintzberg, 1979; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005). Further,
we find that turbulence inTMTscreatedbyoverall size
increases leads to less realignment activity.We suggest
that this happens because executives are less able to
process environmental information and build con-
sensuses around key organizational design decisions
(Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Shank, Zeithaml,
Blackburn, & Boyton, 1988; Sutcliffe, 1994).
The empirical setting for this study is the medical
marketplace and includes 28 (4-digit North American
Industry Classification System [NAICS]) market seg-
ments within the medical device and pharmaceutical
sectors.Weobserve46 firmsover theperiod1975–1997.
For each firm we track its structural evolution noting
how the firm adds, deletes, and recombines its business
units;wealso trace themovementof executives intoand
out of a firm’s TMT. To evaluate environmental change,
we examine the growth and turbulence present in the
industries in which these firms are active, as well as
changes in their TMTs.
The paper is organized as follows. It begins by
drawing from literatures on contingency theory, de-
cision making and organization design to develop
several hypotheses about the conditions under which
firms facing turbulence will initiate structural re-
combination. This is followed by a description of
our methods and measures which outline the data
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and sample, the operationalization of variables, and
the methodology of this study. Finally, the paper con-




The question of how best to organize firms has
long held the interest of organization design schol-
ars (Galbraith, 1977; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967;
Thompson, 1967). Because “organizational design is
one of the key levers available for top managers to
affect how decisions are made within organizations”
(Siggelkow, 2011: 1130), a significant amount of
research in organization theory has been dedicated to
understanding how decision makers can navigate
their firms throughchanging environments toachieve
an optimal organization design. Classic organization
design studieswere built on thepremise that efforts to
coordinate work (or tasks) should be integrated into
a common structure (or unit) to facilitate information
processing and the effective implementation of stra-
tegic initiatives (Chandler, 1962; Galbraith, 1973;
Mintzberg, 1979; Tushman & Nadler, 1978).
Contingency theorists interested in organization
design depict the challenge that firms face by de-
scribing how theyadapt their structures to better align
with changes in external environments (Duncan,
1972; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967).
Classic contingency theory proposes that firms per-
form better when they align themselves to better fit
key factors in their environments, and that environ-
mental changes should lead firms to initiate structural
changes (Donaldson, 1987; Duncan, 1972; Hofer,
1975). Related studies adopting this perspective
have highlighted how different design characteristics
are more or less appropriate for different strategic
environments (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Miles & Snow,
1978; Miller, 1988; Mintzberg, 1979; Siggelkow &
Rivkin, 2005), either because they allow firms to
better utilize resources (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967;
Thompson, 1967) or process information (Galbraith,
1973; Tushman & Nadler, 1978).
Structural Realignment as Business Unit
Recombination
While scholars have made significant progress in
understanding how organizations can achieve an
appropriate fit with their environment, we know
much less about the processes that organizations
take to get there. Over the past decade, however,
scholars who have examined how organizations re-
spond to changes in their environments have de-
voted increasing levels of attention to understanding
how firms use structural recombination to capitalize
on new market opportunities (Karim, 2009; Karim &
Kaul, 2015; Karim & Mitchell, 2004). In contrast to
more traditionally defined restructuring activities
where firms attempt to enter into or exit from markets
by adding (i.e., acquiring) or deleting (i.e., divesting)
business units (Bowman & Singh, 1990; Hoskisson &
Johnson, 1992; Porter, 1987),1 structural recombination
describes initiatives that firms undertake to reorient
how they organize their existing resources and activi-
ties (Karim, 2006, 2009).
While comprising one common way that firms
reconfigure themselves to react to their environment
(Karim & Capron, 2015), firms also use structural
recombination to proactively seek opportunities and
realign their structures with environmental de-
mands in ways that allow their business units to
better utilize resources and organize activities
(Karim, 2012; Karim & Williams, 2012). Although
these activities can be disruptive to organizations,
previous research has shown how firms can use
structural recombination as dynamic capabilities to
adapt to their environments and allow them to in-
crease levels of innovation and overall firm perfor-
mance (Karim, 2009; Karim & Kaul, 2015).
To illustrate how these activities impact firm
evolution, we describe a segment of Johnson and
Johnson’s (J&J’s) history where the firm engaged in
structural realignment activities through a series of
recombinations (Karim & Mitchell, 2004). Figure 1
depicts a sequence of structural recombinations
within (J&J) as it reconfigured its structural organi-
zation to respond to market demands over a 20-year
period. Between 1982 and 1989, J&J recombined its
units Applied Fiberoptics and Kees Surgical Spe-
cialty with Codman & Shurtleff to bolster its mar-
ket position in neurostimulators and orthroscopes.
Then, to have greater impact in the general ortho-
pedic market as a whole, in 1993 J&J recombined
Codman&Shurtleff with J&J Orthopedics to form the
division J&J Professional. Through these realignment
activities, J&J succeeded in growing its overall pres-
ence and market share in orthopedics.
1 Note that we are not directly examining why firms add
or shed activities since there is an established body ofwork
on corporate restructuring that already addresses these
issues. We do, however, account for these other forms of
structural change (i.e., adding and shedding) in our study
and explain more about this in our Methods section.
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Industry Growth and Structural Realignment
Classic contingency theory proposes one way to
generalize these dynamics by suggesting that firms
thatdonot alignwith thedemandsorvolatilityof their
industries should alter their structures and attempt to
regain and maintain an effective “fit” with their en-
vironment (Donaldson, 1987; Duncan, 1972; Hofer,
1975). Building from this proposition, scholars have
demonstrated that firms facing more dynamic envi-
ronments are most effective when they enable flexi-
bility and experimentation by using more organic
structures, while firms facing less dynamic environ-
ments are more successful when they adopt more
routinized structures that encourage stability and
consistency (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Miller & Friesen,
1984; Thompson, 1967; Woodward, 1965).
Priorworkdeveloped from thisperspectivedescribes
how firms use structural recombination to bring re-
sources and activities together in ways that reveal new
synergies and address strategic prospects (Eisenhardt &
Brown, 1999; Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996; Galunic &
Rodan, 1998). For example, Galunic and Eisenhardt
(1996) found that firms’ decision makers often used
recombination as a means of moving “charter” (i.e.,
market) responsibilities between business units to
foster a “dynamic realignment” between a firm and its
market opportunities. In addition, Eisenhardt and
Martin (2000), in describing a “patching” process that
is similar to structural recombination, observe that firms
will attempt to develop their dynamic capabilities
through “processes that use resources. . .to match and
even create market change” (p. 1107).
Building from these observations, we expect that ex-
ecutives will consider industry growth, labeled “mu-
nificence,” as a favorable, but dynamic environmental
condition that encourages them to initiate increased
numbers of structural recombinations. As a common
characteristic highlighted in studies of environmental
change (Dess & Beard, 1984; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008;
Sutcliffe, 1994), munificence represents a strong and
clear indicator of industry growth (Bergh, 1998; Dess &
Beard, 1984; Sharfman & Dean, 1991) that can serve to
signal that market conditions are abundant with op-
portunities for firms that adapt and capitalize on them.
Thus,weexpect that firms in industries thataregrowing
will be proactive in using structural recombination to
adapt in ways that enable them to capture potential
economic gains that are present in these markets.
Hypothesis 1. Industry growth experienced by
afirmin itsenvironmenthasapositiverelationship
with the firm’s degree of structural recombination.
Industry Turbulence and Structural Realignment
Having established that firms in munificent en-
vironments will tend to recombine their structures
FIGURE 1
Examples of Business Unit Reconfiguration (including recombination) at J&J, Inc. (modified from Karim, 2009)
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in ways that allow them to capitalize on perceived
opportunities, we now turn our attention to how
firms experience turbulent environments. While
Hypothesis 1 outlines a positive relationship
between industry growth and structural recombi-
nation, the arguments below describe that, while
predictable, the process by which firms engage
in structural recombination is neither linear nor
continuous.
In Hypothesis 2, we predict that firms will less
frequently engage in structural recombination dur-
ing periods of environmental turbulence (Bourgeois
& Eisenhardt, 1988; Duncan, 1972; Nadkarni & Barr,
2008; Perlow, Okhuysen, & Repenning, 2002). En-
vironmental turbulence describes how rapidly the
links between particular actions and key perfor-
mance indicators can change (Siggelkow & Rivkin,
2005). This canoccur, for example, in environments
where a number of important contingencies evolve
so rapidly that the information decision makers re-
quire to formulate strategic decisions is routinely
incomplete or obsolete (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois,
1988).
Our ideas on this build from decision-making
research on avoiding and delaying decisions
(Anderson, 2003). This research suggests that actors
tend to avoid decisions when selecting an appro-
priate course of action becomes too complicated or
difficult for them (Dhar & Sherman, 1996; Tversky
& Shafir, 1992). These “selection difficulties”
(Anderson, 2003) tend to occur when option sets
change so rapidly that they hamper actors’ ca-
pacities to identify appropriate decision-making
strategies and formulate clear preferences. Under
these conditions, decision makers cannot effectively
evaluate the range of potential options that theymust
consider in formulating potential solutions to prob-
lems (Beattie, Baron, Hershey, & Spranca, 1994; Dhar,
1996, 1997). As a result, they tend to defer decisions,
exhibit omission biases (prefer decisions that do not
require actions), and act to maintain the status quo
(Anderson, 2003).
Prior research on strategic change describes fac-
tors in turbulent environments that are consistent
with these dynamics and generate decision avoid-
ance and delays. As Bourgeois and Eisenhardt
(1988) suggest, “Strategic decision making is prob-
lematic in this kind of (i.e., turbulent) environment
not only because change is so dramatic, but also
because it is difficult to predict the significance of
a change as it is occurring (Sutton, Eisenhardt, &
Jucker, 1986). As a result, it is particularly easy to
make poor strategic judgments. A traditional way to
avoid strategic errors is to simply wait to see how
events unfold. . .” (1988: 817).
We anticipate that firms facing such environmen-
tal turbulence will respond to the relatively high
level of uncertainty they face either by making only
incremental design changes or by delaying entirely
the initiation of structural recombination to alter
their designs (Nickerson & Zenger, 2002). Several
studies on decision making in turbulent and high
velocity environments propose factors that may
combine to retard or delay the tendencies of key
decision makers to initiate structural recombination
(Davis et al., 2009; Dess & Beard, 1984; Sharfman &
Dean, 1991). Overall, they suggest that designing
components of organizational structures during pe-
riods of environmental turbulence is “an attention-
consuming andmistake-prone process (Hatch, 1998;
Weick, 1998)” (Davis et al., 2009: 414) that requires
time-intensive efforts at sense-making (Weick,
1993). Decision makers in turbulent environments
often find it difficult to identify robust cause-and-
effect relationships because critical decision vari-
ables are either unreliable or unavailable (Aldrich,
1979; Fredrickson, 1984;Galbraith, 1973;Nutt, 1976;
Thompson, 1967). In addition, even when decision
makers are able to gather and analyze information,
they may often lack the time to identify and process
the sometimes large amounts of information neces-
sary to decide how their firms’ designs should be
altered (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Fredrickson,
1984; Perlow et al., 2002; Quinn, 1980).
Several other studies highlight how these factors
may combine and increase unpredictability to such
a level that firms delay because decision makers are
paralyzed in making structural realignment de-
cisions. Decision makers in these environments can
suffer from “threat-rigidity,” which tends to make
them more risk-averse and contributes to their ten-
dencies to avoid decisions (Bergh, 1998; Keats & Hitt,
1988; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003). Under these con-
ditions, both their willingness and their ability to
process non-routine information will significantly
decrease (Chattopadhyay, Glick, & Huber, 2001;
Gilbert, 2005; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). As
a result, executives will tend to process information
using familiar perspectives, rely more on authority
and control mechanisms to reinforce existing struc-
tures, and experiment less with changing their orga-
nization’s design through structural recombination
(Bourgeois&Eisenhardt, 1988; Bourgeois,McAllister, &
Mitchell, 1978; Chattopadhyay et al., 2001; Gladstein &
Reilly, 1985; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Thomas,
Clark, & Gioia, 1993).
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Scholars who acknowledge the information
processing challenges present in turbulent (i.e.,
high “dynamism”2) environments have observed
that these factors can specifically hinder the
capacity of decision makers to develop timely
changes to the overall design of their firms (Davis
et al., 2009; Dess & Beard, 1984; Sharfman & Dean,
1991).3 For example, Davis and colleagues (2009)
who examine the influence of environmental
changes on organizational structures conclude
that optimal “amounts” of organizational structure
decrease as environments become less predictable.
Under these conditions, environmental turbu-
lence compromises decision makers’ capacities
to identify the factor patterns that are critical to
determining which structural recombinations may
be most effective within a particular strategic
environment.
Building on this discussion, our second hy-
pothesis describes how environmental industry
turbulence can decrease a firm’s tendency to en-
gage in structural recombination. Because these
activities may be disruptive (Karim, 2009; Karim &
Kaul, 2015), we expect that firms facing increased
turbulence may be less likely to try these orga-
nization design initiatives.4 Thus, as decision
makers facing turbulent environments question
whether realignment via structural recombination
will produce long-lasting, positive effects on firm
performance, we expect that they will be less
likely to initiate these types of structural changes.
Hypothesis 2. Industry turbulence experienced
by a firm in its environment has a negative re-
lationship with the firm’s degree of structural
recombination.
Drawing further on contingency arguments that
firms benefit by evolving with their environments,
we also argue that firmswill engage in higher levels
of structural recombination once the level of en-
vironmental turbulence they face begins to lessen
(Bourgeois et al., 1978: 508; Davis et al., 2009;
Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003). As the volatility of
markets lessens, the information collected by de-
cisionmakers becomesmore consistent and stable,
allowing for faster information processing and
decision making (Galbraith, 1973, 1977). Under
these conditions, decision makers increase their
relative capacity to analyze the strategic environ-
ment and gain greater confidence in their analysis
of their organizational structure. With this confi-
dence, decisionmakers will gain a greater capacity
to develop decision strategies and a willingness to
evaluate decision options. These developments
will decrease the perceived value of maintaining
the status quo and increase the perceived connec-
tions that decision makers see between structural
realignments and firm performance gains. Because
these actors will be more inclined to believe that
structural realignment will have a longer-term,
positive impact on firm performance, they will be
more willing to initiate structural change through
recombination. Stated differently, in some contrast
to Hypothesis 2 where we argue that the absolute
level of market turbulence will negatively impact
structural recombination, we also expect (in Hy-
pothesis 3a) that a rate of decline in this turbulence
will positively impact structural recombination
initiatives.
Even in situations where environmental turbu-
lence is relatively high, a reduction in turbulence
represents a positive signal about the future pre-
dictability of one’s environment (Nadkarni & Barr,
2008; Sutcliffe, 1994). Thus, in addition to expect-
ing that reductions in turbulence will be associated
with increased structural recombination, we an-
ticipate that these reductions will also dampen the
negative relationship between the absolute levels of
industry turbulence that firms encounter and their
tendencies to engage in structural recombination.
2 Please see Sharfman and Dean (1991) for an overview
of classifications of organizations’ environments.
3 Based on prior research, we assume that decision
makers are aware of their external environment (Daft,
Sormunen, & Parks, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989; Garg et al.,
2003; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008), thus deterrence is not due to
lack of awareness.
4 Also noteworthy is empirical evidence that demon-
strates how delays in organizational design decisions can
result in relatively higher levels of firm performance. For
example, in a simulation of structural change and perfor-
mance, Nickerson and Zenger (2002) found that higher
levels of inertia could result in higher levels of perfor-
mancewhen that inertia preventedmanagers frommaking
premature changes to their structures. In addition, Rivkin
and Siggelkow (2003) who model the interdependence
of elements of organization design (including design of
hierarchy, divisionalization, and limits on the ability of
managers to process information), observe that while
higher performing firms actively search for good strategic
solutions, they do not prematurely implement their de-
cisions. Consistent with these observations, Davis and
colleagues (2009) surmise that “. . .adding structure is in-
effective in [a turbulent] environment because there is little
predictable pattern in the flow of opportunities that man-
agers canuse to adjust their organizational structures to the
environment” (Davis et al., 2009: 436).
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Hypothesis 3a. Reductions in industry turbu-
lence experienced by a firm in its environment
have a positive relationship with the firm’s de-
gree of structural recombination.
Hypothesis 3b. Reductions in industry turbu-
lence experienced by a firm in its environment
will dampen the negative relationship between
industry turbulence and the firm’s degree of
structural recombination.
In addition to explicit reductions in industry tur-
bulence,we also expect that executiveswill consider
industry growth (i.e., munificence) as a favorable
signal of environmental conditions. Thus, we expect
that for conditions of both high industry turbulence
and high industry growth, munificence will dampen
the negative relationship between industry turbu-
lence and structural recombination. The primary
reason for this is that executives in growing in-
dustries will perceive environmental turbulence as
relatively less threatening when compared to exec-
utives in firms that face stagnant or shrinking de-
mand. Theywill, thus, bemoremotivated to develop
and implement decision strategies that enable them
to evaluate options around initiating structural re-
alignments (Dhar, 1996, 1997).
As a commoncharacteristichighlighted in studies of
environmental change (Dess & Beard, 1984; Nadkarni
& Barr, 2008; Sutcliffe, 1994), munificence represents
a strong and clear indicator of industry growth (Bergh,
1998;Dess&Beard, 1984; Sharfman&Dean, 1991) that
can serve to signal thatmarket conditions are abundant
with favorable opportunities. As we argued earlier in
advance of Hypothesis 1, munificence signals to de-
cisionmakers that they are not in “danger” (Bourgeois
et al., 1978), and that opportunities to capture addi-
tional market share are available. Even if the overall
level of turbulence that firms experience is high, we
expect that firms will react positively to conditions of
industry growth and be relatively more proactive in
realigning their structures to capture these opportuni-
ties for economic gains.
Hypothesis 4. Industry growth experienced by
a firm in its environmentwill dampen thenegative
relationship between industry turbulence and the
firm’s degree of structural recombination.
Managerial Turbulence and Structural
Realignment
While our discussion so far highlights the envi-
ronmental conditions external to the firm that may
hinder that ability and willingness of decision
makers to pursue structural recombination, it is also
logical to conclude that turbulence within the firm
may also delay these realignment processes. Below,
we build on decision avoidance and group dynam-
ics research to specifically describe how changes in
TMT size and composition may lead firms to delay
the initiation of their structural recombination
efforts.
We focus on these issues because research high-
lights how the interests and perceptions of execu-
tives directly influence how a firm directs its
attention, conducts searches, evaluates problems,
and generates solutions (Child, 1972; Cyert &March,
1963; Hambrick, 1994; Hambrick & Mason, 1984;
March & Simon, 1958; Ocasio, 1997). As previous
studies of organization design have shown, exec-
utives play a critical role in reshaping organiza-
tions to create better alignment with their
environments (Brown& Eisenhardt, 1998; Galunic
& Eisenhardt, 1996; Nadler & Tushman, 1997). For
example, Galunic and Eisenhardt comment that
“. . .because executives are more likely than others
to have broad architectural knowledge of their
firm and are arguably the only oneswith the formal
power and clout to effect such changes, their in-
volvement is key” (2001: 1246). Child (1972) also
stressed the role of executives in formulating and
implementing strategic choices by identifying
them as key mediators between structural align-
ment decisions and environmental conditions
(such as the allocation of resources or whether to
split the firm into smaller units).
Bourgeois and Eisenhardt note that while “de-
cisions should be a product of management team in-
volvement and consensus (Bavelas, 1951; Bourgeois,
1980;Leavitt, 1951). . .particularlyunderconditionsof
high uncertainty” (1988: 818), it takes time to generate
the consensus necessary to initiate these structural
changes. Several computational studies evaluating
group decision making have shown how personnel
changes within decisionmaking groups can affect the
breadth of the search and solution alternatives that
groups consider (Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005) and the
overall number of strategic initiatives pursued by the
firm (Csaszar, 2012). Because firms tend to value ef-
forts to generate consensus among members of the
TMT (Dooley et al., 2000), we expect that turbulence
in the form of executive turnover and growth of the
TMT will delay the extent to which they will realign
their structures with environmental contingencies
and reduce the overall degree to which firm will en-
gage in structural recombination.
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Managerial turbulence as TMT turnover. “One
of the most frequently occurring but daunting chal-
lenges for teams is personnel turnover” (Thompson,
2004:96).Asmembersenterandexit theTMT,both the
expertise and the interpersonal dynamics of the
group change (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Because
the process of formulating and implementing
structural recombination comprises a complex set
of tasks that occurs between often highly in-
terdependent individuals, the entry and exit of TMT
members often significantly compromises the overall
capacity and speed with which these teams process
information relevant to the initiation of structural re-
combination (Argote, Insko, Yovetich, & Romero,
1995; Briggs & Naylor, 1965).
Changingpreferences that are introducedby the loss
or gain of members force TMTs to engage in the often
time-consuming activity of reformulating decision
strategies. This can increase the perceived difficulty
of selecting appropriate responses to environmental
contingencies which can lead TMTmembers to delay
the initiation of structural changes in favor of uphold-
ing the status quo (Anderson, 2003). Under these con-
ditions, TMTs find it more difficult to generate the
robust levels of consensus and commitment that are
necessary to initiate and effectively implement struc-
tural recombination (Dooley et al., 2000).
Hypothesis 5a. Managerial turbulence—in the
form of TMT turnover—has a negative re-
lationship with the firm’s degree of structural
recombination.
Managerial turbulence as TMT growth.Hambrick
andD’Aveni (1992:1449)alsoarguethatTMTsize isan
important consideration because “at a basic level, the
resources available to a team result from how many
people are on it.” As TMT size increases, the growing
numbers of members tend to generate and actively
considera largernumberandamorediversesetof issues
(Cho &Hambrick, 2006;Weick, 1987).While important
for fostering creativity anddecision comprehensiveness
(Weick, 1987), larger TMTs tend to generate greater
numbers of opinions and perspectives (Dearborn &
Simon, 1958) on key strategic issues which retards the
capacity of these collectives to build consensuses
around potential sets of structural solutions (Hambrick,
Cho, & Chen, 1996; Shank et al., 1988; Sutcliffe, 1994).
As numbers ofmembers increase, the capacity of the
TMT to resolve issues around key points of contention
also tends to decrease. Through often prolonged de-
bates over issues, larger TMTs tend to generate higher
levels of cognitive and affective conflicts that further
erode their capacity to agree on appropriate responses
to environmental contingencies (Amason & Sapienza,
1997; Eisenhardt, 1999; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven,
1990). In addition, the negative effect produced by
these conflicts can significantly increase the perceived
risks of proposed structural changes to the status quo
which will augment the perceived value of inaction
and further delay the initiation of structural recombi-
nation (Anderson, 2003).
Hypothesis 5b. Managerial turbulence—in the
form of executive TMT growth—has a negative
relationship with the firm’s degree of structural
recombination.
In summary, although contingency theory proposes
that firms will realign to match their changing envi-
ronments, a theory of group dynamics on decision
making supports the idea that this realignmentmay be
deterred or postponed until more opportune times.
When observing industry turbulence, we argue that
efforts to pursue structural realignment may occur
when there are reductions in turbulence orwhen firms
experience industry growth. Further,we highlight that
turbulence among decision makers may also delay
how rapidly firms align to their environments and
hypothesize that executive turnover and growth of top
management team sizewill inhibit building consensus
around decisionmaking and deter the extent to which
firms engage in structural recombination activities.
The hypotheses we present that describe these re-
lationships are summarized in Figure 2.
METHODS AND MEASURES
Data and Sample
Studying structural recombination and its relation-
ship with turbulence requires a longitudinal sample
(Miles, Snow, & Pfeffer, 1974). We gathered data from
several editions of the Medical & healthcare market-
place guide, namely those published in 1978, 1983,
1986, 1989, 1993, and 1997.5 The guides include in-
formation concerning U.S. and non-U.S. firms operat-
ing in theU.S.medicalmarketplace. For each firm, the
5
“The medical & healthcare marketplace guide” was
published by International Bio-Medical Information Ser-
vices, Inc. (Acton,MA, andMiami, FL; ed. Adeline B. Hale
and Arthur B. Hale) in 1975, 1978, 1983, 1986, and 1989.
Subsequent editions have been published by MLR Pub-
lishing Company (Philadelphia, PA) and by Dorland’s
Biomedical Publications (Philadelphia, PA). We froze our
data collection at 1997 since afterward the recombination
data are no longer as detailed and eventually stop com-
pletely (by early 2000s).
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guidedenotes the business units that exist eachyear.A
business unit is a structural componentwhose identity
is recognized by the firm with a unique address and
some responsibility for one or several product mar-
kets. The guide includes descriptions and histories of
firms and their units. At the unit-level, there is infor-
mationconcerning theunit’sproductmarket activities,
executives, location, origin (i.e., internally developed
or acquired), and any recombination experienced by
a unit. The firm-level information includes descrip-
tionsofunitdivestitures, keypersonnel, key financials,
nationality, date of incorporation, public or private
status, as well as other characteristics.
The sample for this study is 46 firms of a mixed
variety. Toavoid sample bias,we initially beganwith
250 firmswhich exist in the 1978 panel, startingwith
letters A, B, and C.6 These initial 250 firms were
comprised of medical device, pharmaceutical, and
healthcare service firms. This samplewas reduced to
212 firms as we chose to focus on product firms
only,7 excluding the healthcare service firms. Next,
because STATA requires at least two observations
for fixed-effects models and the models include
lagged terms (explained further in the Methodology
section), this reduced the sample further to 111
firms.8 To study our dependent variable (i.e., degree
of structural recombination), we were only in-
terested in firms with multiple units. This further
reducedour sample to 48 firms.Of these 48 firms, ten
firms did not survive to the end of the study period
(1997) (i.e., eight were acquired and two dissolved).
To avoid any bias from failure, we excluded the two
failed firms from the study. However, because we do
not view acquisitions as firm failures (Graebner &
Eisenhardt, 2004), we included the eight firms that
were acquired over the entire period studied. Thus,
our final sample consists of 171 firm-period obser-
vations from 46 firms.
While this sample size may seem small for schol-
ars that are used to working with a large “n,” it is
relatively large and unique for the granular study of
structural change. Current studies in this area have
utilized either simulation models or case-based ex-
aminations representing at most a handful of firms.
In contrast, our sample includes several dozen firms,
FIGURE 2
Firm Realignment through Structural Recombination
Managerial Turbulence (p-1)
TMT turnover




Reduction in Industry Turbulence (p-2 to p-1)
H1 (+)









6 Randomly selecting 250 firms from the 1978 guidewas
considered to be as random as starting from the beginning
of the alphabet. The only noticeable yet negligible bias of
sampling from the beginning of the alphabet is that there
are a greater number of domestic firms (27 firms starting
with the term “American”) and firms practicing in the
medical device category (23 firms starting with the term
“Bio” ofwhich 19weremedical device firms, and ten firms
starting with the term “Cardiac” of which nine were med-
ical device firms). We do not have any reason to believe
that the name of a firm should bias our results in any way.
7 The guides had far more granular levels of categoriza-
tion for product firms than for service firms.
8 A minimum of two observations and lagged in-
dependent variables meant that we had to shrink our
sample to the 111 firms that remained in 1989 of the 250
thatwebeganwith in 1978. For these firms,wewere able to
capture a first observation of reconfiguration between
1986–1989 with lagged independent variables between
1983–1986, and a second observation of reconfiguration
between 1983–1986 with lagged independent variables
between 1978–1983. If these firms survived beyond 1989,
then we had more than two observations.
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which allows us to attribute a relatively high level of
generalizability for our findings. The descriptive
statistics (see Table 1) of this sample support claims
of its diversity; of the 46 firms, about half are di-
versified outside of the medical sector (21), about
a third are private (17), and about a quarter have
foreign parents (13), are not acquisition-active (14),
and are active in pharmaceuticals (14) (versus med-
ical devices). Lastly, we collected external, industry
data on the 28 market segments (based on 4-digit
NAICS codes) inwhich the 46 firmswere active from
Compustat (1973–1997 yearly)9—we describe these
data more in the section on explanatory variables.
Variables and Operationalization
Dependent variable.The dependent variable for
our hypotheses is “degree of recombination”
within a period. This is a count variable of the
number of unit boundary changes (i.e., expansion
or contraction from moved resources and activi-
ties) that occur in a firmwithin a time period. If two
units were combined then both had been struc-
turally altered and this was counted as two re-
combination events. If product market activities
were moved out of a unit and moved to another
unit, this also was counted as two recombination
events since the boundary of the initial unit be-
came smaller and the other unit became larger.
This exemplifies that in our setting it is appropriate
to study both expansion and contraction of busi-
ness units since both are indicative of the firm
attempting to reallocate resources within the firm
of the resources already at hand (Karim, 2012). A
simple view of our operationalization is to imagine
that all of the units of a firm were charted over the
period of the study with arrows indicating when
a unit boundary changed, and that the degree of
recombination is the count of these arrows within
a particular period. As an example, in Figure 1, for
the period 1983–1986 we would calculate that
there are two recombination events: (1) the
boundary of Applied Fiberoptics changed as its
unit was merged into Codman and Shurtleff, Inc,
and (2) the boundary of Codman and Shurtleff, Inc
also changed and grew to encompass the resources
and activities of Applied Fiberoptics. Given that
we have six panels of data, we observe five periods
in our study: 1978–1983, 1983–1986, 1986–1989,
1989–1993, and 1993–1997.
Unit acquisitions and divestitures (during period
“p”),which are choicesmadeby firms to obtainnewor
discard existing resources and activities, were not
considered recombination events in this study, as we
are only interested in the redesign (i.e., redeployment,
reallocation, redistribution)within the firmofwhat the
firm already has to work with and continues to work
with as it realigns. However, if a target that was ac-
quired inperiod“p” is recombined into anotherunit in
the future (e.g., during time period “p11”), this would
be considered a recombination event in that future
period (e.g., during timeperiod “p11”) since the target
belonged to the firm for some period of time. Thus, the
study acknowledges and tracks the eventual re-
combination of acquiredunits. In the example given in
Figure 1, when Applied Fiberoptics was acquired by
J&J in 1982, this event was not considered a re-
combination event when calculating our dependent
variable for the period 1978–1983. However, this ac-
quired unit was later combined with the Codman and
Shurtleff unit by 1986, thus, this recombination was
counted as an event when calculating our dependent
variable for the period 1983–1986.
Explanatory variables. For Hypotheses 1, 2, and
4, our measures of external, industry growth and
turbulence are drawn from Dess and Beard’s (1984)
commonly cited operationalization of industry “mu-
nificence” and “dynamism,” respectively. Dynamism
has been commonly referred to as industry instability,
unpredictability, or turbulence (Sharfman & Dean,
1991;Wholey&Brittain, 1989).We chose to use these
operationalizations since they are widely used by
scholars (Garg, Walters, & Priem, 2003; Nadkarni &
Barr, 2008; Sutcliffe, 1994) and we wanted to remain
consistent with past studies on structural change
(e.g., restructuring) (Bergh, 1998; Keats & Hitt, 1988).
These constructs were originally comprised by Dess
and Beard from Census data using four industry var-
iables (namely industry sales, margin, value added,
and total employment) and captured changes within
industries (based on Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion [SIC] codes)(Dess & Beard, 1984). Taking five-
year Census data, they regressed eachvariable against
time (the past five years) to determine the slope of the
relationship:
yt 5 b0 1 b1t1 at (1)
Munificence (i.e., growth) is the time coefficient es-
timate (b1) (i.e., regression slope) from Equation 1
9 Wealso collected industry data from theU.S. Bureau of
the Census (1972–1996 in five year intervals), however
because the periods did not match exactly with our
reconfiguration periods, we present analysis in this paper
of the more accurately matched data collected from
Compustat.
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divided by the variable’s mean value (Bergh, 1998).
Dynamism (i.e., turbulence) is the standard error of
the time coefficient (b1) divided by the variable’s
mean value. For Dess and Beard (1984), who used
four Census variables to construct their measure,
the munificence (or dynamism) construct was the
sum of these four variables’ munificence (or turbu-
lence) measures. Because the Census data periods
(1977–1982–1987–1992–1997) with five-year gaps
do not often match scholars’ study periods, it is
common for scholars to use only industry sales—a
measure that can be observed outside of Census
data—instead of a four variable sum (Garg et al., 2003;
Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Sutcliffe, 1994). Similarly, we
collected data on munificence and dynamism in in-
dustry sales from Compustat to match our study pe-
riods (i.e., 1978–1983–1986–1989–1993–1997).
After the munificence and dynamism measures
were calculated for each of the 28 market segments
(based on 4-digit NAICS codes) in our sample for the
periods of our study, we then created a weighted
munificence and weighted dynamism measure for
each firm per period that averaged the munificence
(or dynamism) felt by the firm in all of its markets
(i.e., representing all of the 4-digit markets a firm is
active inwithin that period). If a firmwas only active
in one market during period “p”, then its level of
industry growth (or turbulence) for that period “p”
was simply the munificence (or dynamism) of that
market for period “p”. If a firm was active in five
markets in period “p”, we averaged the growth (or
turbulence) of all fivemarkets during that period. See
Table 2 for an example of the dynamism calculations
for external, industry turbulence experienced by
a firm. We construct a “weighted” average of both
industry growth and turbulence per firm per period.
Recall that the guides are extremely granular in list-
ing the product markets of firms; this allows us to
also be more precise in creating overall industry
growth and turbulence measures for a firm for any
period “p”. It may be the case that a firm is active in
five product markets (as listed by the guides; see
Table 2, the fifth column that depicts “1978–1983
Dynamism”) two of which happen to fall under the
same NAICS 4-digit market segment. In such an in-
stance, as depicted in Table 2,wewould include that
4-digit market turbulence (or munificence) measure
twice in our average in order to properly represent
that the firm is more involved in that 4-digit market
sector. In our example in Table 2, the firm’s total
level of industry turbulence for 1978–1983 is the
average of five product markets’ turbulence levels;
notice that both “Diagnostic Test Kits” and “Surgical
Instruments” fall under the 4-digit NAICS market
segment 3391 of “instruments and apparatus” so this
market segment’sdynamism (calculatedas 0.0134) is
counted twice in the industry turbulence average
that is calculated for the firm. Since we do not have
data on firms’ revenue per product market, this
weighting is an attempt to signify the salience of each
market’s turbulence (or growth) to the firm.
For Hypotheses 3a and 3b, we operationalized the
change in industry turbulence as the “amount dyna-
mismreduction”. Thiswas calculatedas thedifference
betweendynamism inanearlierperiodanddynamism
in a latter period (e.g., amount dynamism reduction
(p) 5 dynamism(p-1) – dynamism(p)). Note that if
dynamism reduction is positive this means that dy-
namism is declining (i.e., it was higher before and is
less now). If the reduction value is negative, it means
that dynamism is not declining but actually increasing
(i.e., it was less before and is higher now). Recall, that
weexpect that as theamountof“dynamismreduction”
increases, this signals diminishing turbulence and we
expect decision makers to initiate greater amounts of
structural realignment through recombination.
ForHypotheses5aand5b,weexaminemanagement
as corporate executives atheadquarters (HQ).Note that
the number of executives at HQ represents corporate
team size. Following Romanelli and Tushman (1994)
who operationalized changes in power distribution
within organization design as executive turnover, we
represent management turbulence by calculating two
variables that signify turnover. Corporate executive
turnover at period “p” is labeled “ActualHQ turnover”
and is the count of the number of executiveswhowere
addedtoandremovedfromtheTMTfromperiod“p-1”
to “p”. “Amount increase incorporate teamsize” is the
change in the total number of corporate executives in
headquarters fromperiod “p-1” to “p”whereapositive
value indicates an increase in the team size by that
amount, and a negative value indicates a decrease in
the team size by that amount.
Control variables. There are several other firm,
industry, and time-levelcontrols included in thestudy.
We acknowledge that decision makers may want to
initiate structural change but be unable to due to in-
ertial constraints. Thus, for our firm-level controls, we
control for this by including size andage of firms inour
models. Firm-level controls10 include “log of medical
sales” (to proxy size), “percent medical sales” (to
evaluate diversified firms), and “log of age”.We expect
10 We had to exclude “number of employees” to avoid
multicollinearity with other variables; it was highly cor-
related with medical sales and age.
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that firms that are more focused on the medical sector
may findmore opportunities for recombination due
to their specialization and knowledge of the mar-
kets. Older firms, though they may have more re-
sources at their disposal to pursue change, often
suffer from inertial constraints deterring structural
change (Nickerson & Zenger, 2002).
ComplementingHypothesis5aand5b, scholarshave
identified several other internal core elements (along
with management) that, when turbulent, may be asso-
ciatedwith structural realignment (Nadler &Tushman,
1997; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994; Tushman &
Romanelli, 1985). There is consensus within organi-
zation design literature that organizational effective-
ness is enhanced when an organization’s design not
only matches its external environment, but also when
the firm maintains a fit, congruence, or alignment be-
tween its external environment and its internal ele-
ments (Burton, Lauridsen, & Obel, 2002; Miller &
Friesen, 1984; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). These
internal elements include power and people distri-
bution (i.e., what we proxy as management), a firm’s
market strategies, control systems and work coordina-
tion, performance and growth, and a firm’s culture
(Nadler & Tushman, 1997; Tushman & Romanelli,
1985). Nadler and Tushman highlight howdisruptions
in these internal elements represent “several situations
that typically justify a major redesign” (1997: 49), thus
we control for turbulence in these areas.11
Market strategies are represented by both the
number of product markets in which a firm is active,
as well as how acquisition active a firm is during
a period “p” (Karim&Mitchell, 2000). For turbulence
in market activities, we operationalize “percent
turnover of productmarkets” as the percent change in
the total number of product markets the firm is active
induringperiod “p” as compared to “p-1”. To capture
turbulence from relative acquisition activity, we in-
clude “percent of acquired units” during a period “p”
to signify level of acquisition activity as compared to
internal development. Work coordination is repre-
sented by the number of total units operated by the
firm during a period “p” (Mintzberg, 1979); turbu-
lence in work coordination is calculated as the “per-
cent increase in total units” operated by the firm from
period “p-1” to “p” (andmaybepositive indicating an
increase or negative indicating a decrease). Finally,
performance is characterized by a firm’s total sales for
TABLE 1
Sample Firms’ Descriptive Statistics
Summary of 46 firms:
Survive to 1997? 38 survive 8 acquired
Public? 29 public 17 private
Foreign? 13 foreign parents 33 U.S. parent/firm
Industry? 32 medical devices 14 pharmaceuticals
Acquisition-active? 32 acquisition-active 14 no acquisition activity
Diversified? 21 diversified 25 only medical
Summary of variables in analyses from 46 firms:
OBS MEAN SD MIN MAX
Degree of recombination (p) 171 3.02 5.99 0 46
Log medical sales (p-1) 171 5.00 1.06 3.00 6.96
Percent medical sales (p-1) 171 0.69 0.36 0.00 1.00
Log firm age (p-1) 171 1.72 0.31 0.90 2.20
Percent turnover of product markets (p-1) 171 0.58 0.92 0 6
Percent of acquired units (p-1) 171 0.30 0.29 0 0.88
Percent increase in total units (p-1) 171 0.15 0.50 20.67 3.00
Percent increase in total sales (p-1) 171 1.04 4.38 20.87 44.50
Actual HQ turnover (p-1) 170 0.92 1.65 0 13
Amount increase in corp team size (p-1) 170 0.09 1.67 213 6
Industry munificence (p-1) 171 0.11 0.09 20.12 0.32
Industry dynamism logged (p-1) 171 21.67 0.32 22.32 20.70
Amount dynamism reduction (p-1) 171 20.00 0.04 20.15 0.19
Dummy dynamism reduction (p-1) 171 0.45 0.50 0 1
Acquisition activity in industry (p-1) 171 77.20 66.22 2.00 342.67
Change in rivalry in industry (p-1) 171 59.42 141.13 2100 516.60
11 We were unable to identify an indicator of culture in
ourdata source sowe cannot include cultural disruption as
a control.
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a period “p”, and thus performance turbulence is
calculated as the “percent increase in total sales” for
a period “p” compared to “p-1” reflecting relative
performance change at the firm (and may be positive
indicating an increase or negative indicating a de-
crease).12 Lastly, all models include panel period
dummies (with the period 1993–1997 omitted) to
control for any time-sensitive heterogeneity that may
have occurred during our study period.
Methodology
Our hypotheses predict that both industry char-
acteristics (of growth and turbulence) and manage-
rial turbulence will be associated with the firm’s
degree of structural recombination. Because this
dependent variable is a non-negative count variable
of recombination events during a period “p”, a linear
model’s assumptions of homoskedasticity (where
variance of the residuals is constant) and normally
distributed errors are violated producing in-
consistent, inefficient, and biased coefficient esti-
mates. In such cases, one should use either a negative
binomial or Poisson model (Long, 1997). Recent
econometric advances advocate using quasi maxi-
mum likelihood fixed-effects Poisson models to
control for unobserved firm heterogeneity and be-
cause it provides consistent estimates (compared to
the negative binomial) under general conditions
(Rysman & Simcoe, 2008; Wooldridge, 1999). Fur-
ther, we run Poisson models that apply robust stan-
dard errors to our estimates using the STATA
command “xtpqml”,13 as well as models that do not
TABLE 2

















Biochemicals Chemicals 3259 0.0163 0.0268 0.0541 0.0211 0.0180
Biologicals Biological products 3254 0.0039 0.0085 0.0048 0.0045 0.0056




3391 0.0107 0.0134 0.0864 0.0254 0.0103
Separation Equipment Electromedical
equipment
3345 0.0129 0.0324 0.0059 0.0132 0.0079




3391 0.0134 0.0864 0.0254
Firm’s Level of Industry Dynamism (weighted average) 0.01095 0.01890 0.04752 0.01792 0.01045
a for Accurate Chemical and Scientific Corp.
Note: Dynamism in Market 3259 (for 1978) 5 0.0163 5 Std:Err:ðB1Þ
IndustrySales
where “B1” is the estimated coefficient from the regression model
yt 5 b0 1 b1t1 at inwhich “y” represents Industry Sales, and “t” represents time from 1973–1977. (Bergh, 1998; Dess &Beard, 1984; Garg et al.,
2003; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Sharfman & Dean, 1991; Sutcliffe, 1994; Wholey & Brittain, 1989)
Firm’s Level of Industry Dynamism (for 1978)5Markets’Dynamism5 average(0.0163, 0.0039, 0.0107, 0.0129) 5 0.01095
Firm’s Level of Industry Dynamism (for 1983)5Markets’Dynamism5 average(0.0268, 0.0085, 0.0134, 0.0324, 0.0134) 5 0.01890
12 Note that this variable denotes both increase or de-
crease (as in positive or negative values) as well as mag-
nitude (in the percentage amount change from a former
period to a latter period). For example, if a firm’s sales
change from $100 million to $200 million between two
periods, itwill have apercent changeof1100%. If the sales
change from $100 million to $150 million, it will have
a percent change of 150%. Alternatively, if the sales go
from $100 million to $50 million, it will have a percent
change of 250%. We expect, based on performance ex-
pectations and problemistic search, that decision makers
facing declining percent changes in performance will ini-
tiate more structural realignment. Thus, to state the in-
verse, as this variable (the percent value) increases
reflecting that performance change is positive, we expect
firms to recombine less. In our examples given here, when
the firmhas250% increase itwould be expected to pursue
more recombination then when it has150% increase, and
similarly the firm with150% increase would be expected
to pursue more recombination than when it has 1100%
increase in sales.
13 For fixed-effects models, STATA requires aminimum
of two observations per group (i.e., firm) and dropped
groups with zero reconfigurations across all time periods.
Thecommand“xtpqml”produces estimates that are robust
to “both heteroskedasticity and arbitrary serial correlation
in the dependent variable” (Rysman & Simcoe, 2008: 22).
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apply robust standard errors to compare our results
with prior research. Note that when applying robust
standard errors the standard for finding significance
in our coefficient estimates is much more stringent
thanpast literature that has typically used traditional
Poisson models without robust standard errors.
To minimize issues of endogeneity (and in par-
ticular reverse causality), we model the effect that
turbulence has on future recombination, and thus
use lagged values of our explanatory variables as
regressors in the estimated equation (see Equation
2) (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Judge, Hill, Griffiths,
Lutkepohl, & Lee, 1988). This technique is appro-
priate for panel data. In this study, a group is a firm
(j), “X” represents control variables, and our lagged
explanatory variables are noted. Thus, at the level
of analysis of firm-year observations, one of our
models resembles:
Recombinationj,p 5 expðb0 1 b1Munificencej,p1
1 b2Dynamismj,p1 1 b3Amt_Dyn_Reductionj,p1
1 b4ðAmt_Dyn_Reductionj,p1*Dynamismj,p1Þ
1 b5Management_Turbj,p1 1 :::1 bnXj,p1Þ
(2)
Thus, recombination at firm “j” during period “p” is
evaluatedasa functionof growthand turbulenceduring
period “p-1”, and controls for period “p-1”. Recall that
the study is comprised of six panels (1978, 1983, 1986,
1989, 1993 and1997) of firm-level data from the guides,
with a total of fiveperiods of data observed (1978–1983,
1983–1986, 1986–1989, 1989–1993, 1993–1997). For
any explanatory variables that are not captured over
a duration of time (period “p-1”), we measure the vari-
able at the end of period “p-1”; for example, when we
observe a firm’s market entry and exit over the period
1989–1993, the variable is measured over the period
1986–1989 but some control variables such as age are
captured at the end of that time period at 1989. Because
we include a period lag there are at most four observa-
tions per firm (j).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We test the relationship of internal and external
turbulenceonstructural recombination.Table 3 shows
the correlations between our measures. A glance at
the correlation matrix of the turbulence variables
(Table 3) highlights that turnover of corporate execu-
tives (corr 5 0.644) is positively correlated with re-
combination,whichprovides a preliminary indication
that Hypothesis 5a may not be supported. The high
correlation between medical sales and age (corr 5
0.533) indicates that, in our sample, older firms gener-
ally earn greater revenue than younger firms. Further,
growing industries are associated with less industry
turbulence (corr 5 –0.508). Since several of our corre-
lations are high, we also test for multicollinearity and
find that our data meet the standard criteria required
indicating the multicollinearity does not unduly affect
the relationships we observe.14
In Table 4,15 we show our analysis of how industry
growth and turbulence, as well as managerial turbu-
lence,may influencea firm’s choice topursue structural
recombination.Model1 includesonlycontrolvariables.
In Model 2 we add the variable for managerial turbu-
lence.Finally, inModel3weadd the industrymeasures
of munificence (growth) and dynamism (turbulence).
Model3maybeconsidered the fullmodelbefore testing
further moderating effects and robustness checks. In
Table4weshowtheregressionestimates for thePoisson
models aswell as those that applymore stringent robust
standard errors. In latter tables we sometimes show re-
sults only with robust standard errors if coefficient es-
timates of interest are significant. If only a Poisson
model is shownandamodelwithrobust standarderrors
is not shown, it means that the coefficient estimates of
interest were not significant in the robust case but were
only for the regular Poisson. For brevity we have ex-
cluded them from some tables.
Industry Conditions and Structural Realignment
The results in Table 4 Model 3 show support for
Hypothesis1whichpredicts that industrygrowthwill
be positively related to a firm’s degree of structural
recombination; the coefficient estimate on “munifi-
cence” is significant for the Poissonmodel and it still
hasweak significancewhen applying robust standard
errors. Model 3 also provides strong support for
Hypothesis 2, which predicts that industry-level,
14 We test for multicollinearity (where correlated pre-
dictorsmay inflate standard errors) by calculating variance
inflation factors (VIFs) andcondition indices for predictors
of each model. None of the individual VIFs exceed the
accepted threshold of 10 (they are all under 2 in our
models), and no condition index exceeds 30; Belsley, Kuh,
and Welsch (1980) suggest that higher metrics indicate
collinearity problems. Our Model 3 has a condition num-
ber (highest condition index) of 26.80 and a mean VIF of
1.41, indicating that multicollinearity is not a significant
problem (Belsley, 1991).
15 In themodel regressions the samplewas reduced from
46 firms to 34 firms since STATA dropped 12 firms due to
their having no variance in the dependent variable.
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external, turbulence is associated with less struc-
tural recombination. We find that the industry
dynamism estimates are negative and highly signif-
icant, and maintain significance when applying ro-
bust standard errors.
For further insight into our negative coefficient re-
sultwhen testingHypothesis 2we turn to the literature
on organization design, and specifically on restruc-
turing. Although many papers have theoretically
linked external, industry attributes to structural
change, we found only two studies that empirically
investigated this relationship with the same explana-
tory variable (of industry turbulence) as in our study
(but slightly different dependent variables regarding
structure). In one paper, Bergh (1998), drawing on the
information-processing logic of contingency theory,
hypothesized that if a rationale of efficiency is attrib-
uted to restructuring, then during times of external
environmental uncertainty firms will shed unrelated
businesses and acquire related ones as it is easier to
integrate and coordinate businesses that are un-
derstood. Interestingly, he found that this logic alone
did not hold true since during times of uncertainty
firms also significantly acquired unrelated businesses,
indicating some logicofmanaging risk (e.g., in this case
bydiversification) as an economic rationale for driving
structural change. This general idea is supported in
a study by Keats and Hitt (1988) who examined how
external environmental dimensions of instability and
complexity were linked to structural characteristics
of divisionalization and size. In a structural equation
model using data from manufacturing firms, they
found that external instability was associated with
lower levels of structural divisionalization (i.e., fewer
number of units), where divisionalization represents
decentralization and specialization in decision mak-
ing. This finding implies that during times of external
industry turbulence firms are more likely to organize
into fewer, larger units—again reiterating a rationale of
managing risk (e.g., in this case by pooling activities).
We view these risk-averse behaviors as analogous to
our findings that when faced with similar environ-
mental turbulence, firms pursue less structural re-
alignment initiatives.
Delaying Change
Biding time for a better environment. In Hy-
potheses 3a, 3b and 4we propose that firms facedwith
better environmental conditions will initiate more
structural realignment. In Table 5 we test Hypothesis
3a and 3b by examiningwhether there is a relationship
between the amount of dynamism reduction and
structural recombination. In Model 4 we include only
the dynamism reduction variable, and in Model 5 we
include both the level of dynamism as well as dyna-
mism reduction, and find support for Hypothesis 3a.
Even when controlling for the level of dynamism, if
firms face a decline in dynamism from the previous
period they are more likely to have recombinations in
the current period. In Model 5 we test whether this
dynamism reduction moderates the direct negative
influence of dynamism on recombination, but the es-
timate is not significant. If we relax the granularity of
the measure and operationalize dynamism reduction
as a dummy variable (equaling 1 if there is a reduction
in dynamism), as in Model 7, we continue to find
support for Hypothesis 3a (as expected) and find only
weak support for Hypothesis 3b since the interaction
term is significant in the Poisson model but not when
applying robust standard errors.
Although we found support for Hypothesis 1 in
Table 4 Model 3 and observe that munificence has
apositive relationshipwithstructural recombination, in
Table5wesee that this significance is lost (but estimates
are still positive) once we take into consideration dy-
namism reduction.When both characteristics of a “bet-
ter” environment are tested in a model, recombination
has a stronger significant relationship with dynamism
reduction thanwith industry growth.This sheds insight
into which environmental condition is more salient for
executives as they consider structural realignment. To
test Hypothesis 4, we include the interaction term of
munificenceanddynamisminTable6Model8andfind
onlyweaksupport (as theestimatesaresignificant in the
regular Poisson model but lose significance when ap-
plying robust standard errors).
Comparatively, our findings indicate weaker sup-
port for Hypotheses 1 and 4—that decision makers
initiate more structural realignment when there is
more industry growth—and stronger support for Hy-
potheses 3a and 3b—that executives initiate realign-
mentwhentheenvironment signalsgreater reductions
in turbulence.
Biding time until the environment is “really
bad.” Although our findings indicate support for the
risk-averse behavior of decision makers to pursue less
structural realignment when faced with industry turbu-
lence, a contingency frameworksuggests that executives
may be biding time not just for better environmental
conditions, but for when they feel the environment is
really bad and the firm is excessively misaligned. In
otherwords, decisionmakersmay have some threshold
of external turbulence, or a “tipping point,” after which
they consider initiating recombination. This salient tip-
ping point was the basis of Miller’s (1982) “quantum
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view of structural change”. In his view,Miller proposed
that because incremental, frequent structural change is
costly, firms should pursue “quantumor revolutionary”
structural change only after “a critical state of in-
congruence with the environment is reached” (p. 133).
This view complements contingency theory’s expecta-
tion that firms may choose to tolerate some degree of
external turbulence until enough evidence of a misfit
accumulates to produce a perceived state of non-
equilibrium significant enough to motivate firms to
pursue structural change (Romanelli &Tushman, 1994).
We explored this second rationale for biding time—
waiting until a “critical state of incongruence”—by
testing both a U-shape quadratic relationship between
industry-leveldynamismandstructural recombination,
as well as a split-sample analysis of low and high dy-
namism groups. The results are shown in Table 7.
Model 11 includes a quadratic term, but we do not find
support foraU-shaperelationship inwhichthenegative
effect of turbulence on recombination is followed by
a positive effect. The coefficient on the square term is
negative and insignificant. The split-sample analysis in
Models 12 and 13 sheds some light on our analysis;
these models split the sample around the median level
of industry turbulence. We find that in cases of lower
dynamism the effect of dynamism on recombination is
negative and significant, and for cases of higher dyna-
mism the effect is still negative and significant but less
negative. Thus, decision makers may be more prone
(i.e., lessnegative) to initiate structural recombination in
the case of higher dynamism as compared to lower
dynamism,butoverall the influence is stillnegative; this
indicates that the relationship observed is somewhat
comparable to the left-side of a U-shape relationship
where the steepness of the negative effect declines from
lower tohigherdynamism,16 butwedonot find the right
TABLE 6
Relationship of Firm-level and Industry-level Turbulence(p-1)withStructuralRecombination(p)Quasimaximum likelihood
fixed-effects poisson regression (without or with robust standard errors)
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
poisson robust SE robust SE robust SE
Controls
Log of medical sales (p-1) 20.326 (0.465) 20.326 (0.504) 20.479 (0.590) 20.173 (0.553)
% medical sales (p-1) 2.649* (1.135) 2.649* (1.321) 4.162** (1.362) 3.389** (1.239)
Log of age (p-1) 2.378 (3.686) 2.378 (4.481) 0.589 (5.560) 20.442 (4.218)
% turnover of product markets (p-1) 20.028 (0.107) 20.028 (0.164) 0.001 (0.159) 20.133 (0.154)
% of acquired units (p-1) 2.055*** (0.480) 2.055** (0.748) 2.194*** (0.608) 1.774** (0.637)
% increase in total units (p-1) 0.652*** (0.195) 0.652* (0.324) 0.604** (0.239) 0.849*** (0.258)
% increase in total sales (p-1) 20.041 (0.043) 20.041 (0.037) 20.063 (0.043) 20.055 (0.039)
Managerial Turbulence
Actual HQ turnover5 Entry and
exit of corporate executives at HQ (p-1)
20.016 (0.053) 20.016 (0.075) 20.023 (0.058) 20.010 (0.057)
Amount increase in corporate
team size (p-1)
–0.085*** (0.025) –0.085* (0.035) –0.092*** (0.029) –0.106*** (0.029)
Environmental Change
Sales munificence (growth)(p-1) 20.484** (7.853) 20.484 (12.756) 5.884 (4.295) 5.393 (4.086)
Sales dynamism logged (turbulence)(p-1) –3.577*** (0.911) –3.577*** (0.998) –1.872* (0.951) –2.405** (0.849)
Interaction: Sales dynamism *
Sales munificence
11.837* (5.939) 11.837 (8.437)
Acquisition activity in industry (p-1) –0.020*** (0.005)
Change in rivalry in industry (p-1) –0.009*** (0.003)
Panel Period Dummies yes yes yes
Number of Observations 131 131 131 131
Number of Groups 34 34 34 34
Wald chi2 119.41 185.30 203.14 244.13
Prob . chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Significant estimates: ; p , 0.1, *p , 0.05, **p , 0.01, ***p , 0.001
16 Note that we do not find evidence of a quadratic re-
lationship between turbulence and recombination, so
our findings of the split-sample results indicate more of
a tilted-step function. On the “left side” of the graph with
lower dynamism there is a steep negative slope. On the
“right side” of the graph when there is higher dynamism
the slope is less steep but still negative. We never see a tilt
upwards with a positive slope.
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side of the U-shape with a positive effect that would
indicate a tipping-point.
Together, the prior studies’ showing risk-averse
behaviors of executives (Bergh, 1998; Keats & Hitt,
1988) as well as our finding a lack of a tipping-
point indicate that decision makers seem to be
biding time for environmental conditions to im-
prove before they pursue structural realignment.
These findings give us greater confidence that
our negative coefficient estimate on the influence
of external turbulence on recombination is in-
dicative of behavioral choicesmade by executives,
not inertial constraints. Recall, also, that in our
models we control for inertia through firm size (as
sales) and age. Thus, our findings suggest that it
is not so much that decision makers are unable
to structurally change as it may be that they are
delayed by the environment and choose to wait for
better conditions.
Robustness checks. To further test the robust-
ness of our results that indicate a negative direct
influence of turbulence on recombination, we
examined several other indicators of industry
turbulence.17 First, we captured the level of “ac-
quisition activity” in the industries studied as an
indicator of consolidation and gathered data from
the Securities Data Company (SDC) database on
the industries in our sample for the number of
acquisitions that took place during our study pe-
riod. Second, we captured the level of competition
(i.e., rivalry) in industries by gathering data from
Compustat for the number of public firms that exis-
ted during the periods in our study; as another form
of industry turbulence,we added “change in rivalry”
to ourmodel. Building on themodel specifications of
Model 3, our results are shown in Table 6 inModel 9
and Model 10. Both of these additional industry
turbulence measures are highly significant and have
a negative relationship with structural change, rein-
forcing our confidence in our original (commonly
used) industry sales dynamism measure.
Managerial Conditions and Structural
Realignment
We now turn our attention to turbulence among
decision makers. Hypotheses 5a and 5b expect that
turbulence in management in the form of executive
turnover at corporate headquarters and growth in the
TMT may hinder structural realignment due to their
inability to process information and build consensus
around structural recombination decisions. Although
the coefficient estimates are negative, our analysis
finds that the turnover of corporate executives does
not significantly affect recombination, thus there isno
support for Hypothesis 5a. We do find, however, that
change in the corporate team size does have a signifi-
cant and negative relationship with structural re-
combination, giving support to Hypothesis 5b.
Interestingly, when doing robustness checks of sim-
ple magnitudes, we find that team size itself (not
change in team size) is not significant.18 Thus, it is not
simply the sizeof a team (i.e., a larger team) thatdeters
recombination, but the increase in the size of the team
from the prior period. Let’s imagine four scenarios for
a firm. In Scenario A, the firm grew from having four
corporate executives to eight, thus the change in cor-
porate team size is the addition of four executives. In
Scenario B, the firm grew fromhaving a TMT of six to
eight, changing the corporate team size by two exec-
utives. In both scenarios A and B, the corporate team
size is ultimately eight. Now consider Scenario C in
which the firm’s corporate team size grew from ten to
14 executives, a change of four. In ScenarioD the firm
grew from a TMT of 12 to 14, a change of two. In both
scenarios C and D the corporate team size is 14. Re-
gardless of whether the firm has a TMT size of eight
versus 14, according to our findings thiswill not have
a significant impact on the degree of structural re-
combination in the next period. However, both sce-
narios A and C are examples in which the firm had
a change in team size of four executives, and both sce-
narios B and D are examples of situations where firms
had a change in team size of two executives. Based on
ouranalysis inTable4, if the firmexperiencedascenario
likeAorC(i.e., ascomparedtoscenariosBorD), thiswill
have a significant andnegative impact on the number of
business unit recombinations in the next period. These
17 Recall that our operationalization of external industry
turbulence is based on a dynamism measure of industry
sales (Dess & Beard, 1984; Garg et al., 2003; Nadkarni &
Barr, 2008; Sutcliffe, 1994). As a robustness check, we also
operationalized dynamism based on industry operating
income and industry net income; these data were also
gathered from Compustat for our 28 4-digit NAICS seg-
ments and a weighted dynamism measure was calculated
for each firm in each panel depending on whichmarkets it
was active in.Our resultswere robust; coefficient estimates
were still negative and significant.
18 To fully understand the relationship between our
constructs, we also conducted regression analyses for the
magnitude measures of our variables. We show in the pa-
per only the tables with turbulence measures (i.e., relative
change in our variables) for the sake of brevity. These ad-
ditional models of magnitude are available upon request.
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results have potential implications to decision
making in the TMT; the greater the addition of ex-
ecutives to the team, the more difficult it may be for
them to reach consensus or form a dominant logic
around structural realignment decisions (Cyert &
March, 1963, Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Inversely,
the greater the deletion of executives from the cor-
porate team, the easier it may be for the team to
reach a consensus that supports structural change.
When examining our controls, note that we con-
trol for turbulence in firms’ other core elements,
namely market strategies, work coordination, and
performance (Nadler & Tushman, 1997; Tushman &
Romanelli, 1985). Of these controls, we find a sig-
nificant influence of turbulence from increased ac-
quisition activity within the firm to be positively
related to structural realignment. This is consistent
with prior work on acquisitions and recombination
(Karim, 2006; Puranam, Singh, & Chaudhuri, 2009),
and structural change in general (Capron, Dussauge,
& Mitchell, 1998; Capron & Mitchell, 1998; Johnson,
1996). We also find a positive relationship between
percent increase innumber of total units (i.e., a sign of
greater divisionalization of work) and recombination.
This is consistent with research that has shown that
firms may recombine structures to form fewer, larger
units to enable better coordination or consolidation
(Argyres, 1996; Johnson, 1996). In our models, al-
though the coefficient estimates for “percent increase
in total sales” are negative, they are not significant. Of
our panel perioddummies, only theperiod1986–1989
had significantly more recombination activity com-
pared to the period 1993–1997 across firms in our
sample.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper was to build upon contin-
gency theory and organization design literatures to
better understand when and how decision makers
pursue structural realignment to regain fit with
changing environments. We drew on decision-
making and group dynamics theories to inform our
understanding of more nuanced contingencies that
may drive or hinder structural change.
Though a general prescription of contingency
theory may be to realign structure when there is in-
dustry growth, we hypothesized that external envi-
ronmental change in the form of industry turbulence
may deter alignment (i.e., until other opportune
conditions arise) for several reasons. Specifically,we
argued that during industry turbulence, the inability
of decision makers to collect or process information
related to how to realign their structures will lead
them to delay or avoidmaking these decisions. Their
tendencies to do this may be exacerbated by pre-
dictions that any benefits from recombination will
be unattainable or will at least be less than what can
be obtained by maintaining the status quo. This
negative relationship between industry turbulence
and structural recombination abates under better
environmental conditions of industry growth and
declining turbulence, where decision makers are
able to develop decision strategies and more effec-
tively evaluate the benefits of structural alignments
through recombination.
We also explored whether it was only better ex-
ternal environments that would trigger structural
change, or whether it could be that firms were
waiting for a critical state of misfit before pursuing
recombination. We did not find evidence of this
tipping-point but did find evidence of a less nega-
tive effect for higher versus lower levels of industry
turbulence, resembling something comparable to
the left-side of a U-shape relationship that is not
smooth (i.e., a really steep negative slope, followed
by a less steep negative slope). This finding further
supports our contention that decision makers will
delay attempting to structurally realign their orga-
nizations within turbulent external environments,
and instead bide their time for better environmental
conditions.
Our second focus was to draw attention to how
internal turbulence among TMTs can also hinder
decision making and structural realignment initia-
tives.Whenexamining howmanagement turbulence
may impact structural realignment, we did not find
a significant influence of executive turnover but did
find that growth in TMT size is associated with less
structural recombination. We attribute this negative
effect to difficulties in evaluating data that hinders
the capacities of TMTs to reach agreements on key
issues. This finding informs organizational design
theory in that not only size anddiversitymay impede
TMT choices about organizational forms, but also
that increases in the TMT size may lead to decision-
making delays about changes in a firm’s organiza-
tional structures.
Our study has several managerial implications.
Given that we found an inclination for firms to bide
time for better industry conditions (than excessively
bad levels of turbulence) before initiating structural
realignment, decision makers need to judge what
industry conditions are considered favorable to
them. Also, we did find a lessening negative in-
fluence for the firms facing greater versus lesser
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industry turbulence; thoughwedidnot find a tipping-
point, firms may have changing external conditions
(e.g., new regulatory oversight or rules) that do create
an upswing in recombination. Executives should be
aware of other factors in their environments thatmay
emerge to trigger critical misfit and structural re-
alignment. Finally, firms should be cognizant of not
changing the team size radically from one period to
the next so as not to exacerbate difficulties in pro-
cessing information and potential delays in forming
decision consensuses.
There are certainly limitations to our investiga-
tion and many potential extensions. A limitation to
this study is that we do not explore the performance
implications of structural realignment through re-
combination; do those firms that defy the norm and
tackle the potential disruption of structural change
even under “bad” environmental conditions per-
form better or worse than those that do not attempt
it? It would also be interesting to examine what
capabilities firms possess that make unit recombi-
nation successful and to explore if and how these
capabilities are established. We observed that
changes in team size has a relationship with struc-
tural change; it would also be particularly interest-
ing to explore in greater detail the composition of
such teams and the executives’ histories to see
whether thesemake a difference in how teams reach
consensus. Our sample size was limited to 46 firms
in two medical sectors (pharmaceuticals and
medical devices) due to the demands of intricate
mapping of structural change over a 20-year period.
Other sectors may reveal different patterns of orga-
nizational responses to turbulence; Hrebeniak and
Snow (1980) did find that organizational responses
to environmental uncertainty vary by industry.
Undoubtedly, we will gain a better understanding
of the generalizability of our findings if additional
sectors are studied.
Our goal was to examine how firms react to
environmental turbulence through structural
realignment, specifically recombination. To our
knowledge, there has not been an empirical
analysis at this level of granularity on changing
business unit boundaries, nor one that also con-
siders the factors thatmayhinder decisionmakers in
the process of realignment. By studying how both
external industry forces and TMT changes within
the firm impact decision makers’ capacities to pro-
cess information and form consensuses, we have
aimed at providing organization design scholars
with greater insights into factors that influence
structural change.
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